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Book Review: Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Reviewed by Joseph Davis
Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. By Ron Schleifer.
New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014. 218 pages.
$95.27 (Paper).  ISBN: 9781137467021 (e-book)
PSYWAR--what is it good for?  While not publicized, Psychological
Warfare, the most potent weapon leveraged by both sides in the
1947 to present Arab-Israeli conflict, finally gets the attention it
deserves.  Author and researcher Ron Schleifer offers a play-by-play
analysis highlighting the successes and failures at each milestone of
this fight, and does so at a pace in which the time-strapped reader
can digest with deep understanding. 
Shleifer starts with the three principles of psychological warfare: the target audience, the
message, and the means of delivery, which are important as he continues to reference them
as he dissects each phase.  From there, he chronologically reviews the historical milestones
beginning with pre-state Israel’s exploitation of media to influence international opinion against
the British Government’s enforcement of their Palestine anti-immigration policy following World
War II.  Surprisingly, and only because there isn’t much to report, he makes a quick touch-and-
go on the Arab-Israeli Wars from 1948-1982 before landing in the unprecedented PSYWAR
conducted by Hezbollah against Israel in southern Lebanon.  Schleifer ends with the Second
Intifada of the Palestinians waged in the early 2000s.  The Israelis, slow to adopt that war’s
lessons, were completely out-matched by the Palestinians in the use of the internet and
exploitation of foreign news media.  Finally, he offers two vignettes: The 2008 Israeli PSYWAR
Operation “Cast Lead,” which shed a light on the inadequacy of their psychological operations;
and the 2010 Mavi Marmara Affair which provides striking similarities to the British anti-
immigration enforcement half a century earlier.
Schleifer is a senior lecturer at Ariel University in Israel and the Head of the Ariel Research
Center for Defense and Communications.  He has spent twenty-five years researching and
writing about psychological warfare in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  One would expect that he
would take a partisan position regarding his own country, yet he is repeatedly critical of Israel’s
actions, or lack thereof.  Never failing to look at an event from all sides, he thoroughly
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evaluates the performance of Israeli and Arab political-military organizations, points out
successes and failures in strategy and execution, and frankly describes what could have been
done to be more effective. 
The sequential style and analytical structure of the book allows any reader to readily follow the
timeline of events and the progress of the psychological warfare campaigns.  The book
provides a superb illustration of the power of a well-orchestrated PSYWAR campaign
conducted in tandem with military action.  Given the significance of this perpetual hostility and
its consequences that reverberate throughout the region, it is easy for the reader to become
absorbed in the details and find value in the lessons presented.  Schleifer repeatedly
demonstrates how a militarily inferior force--first, the Israelis, then, the Palestinians--was able
to turn a tactical loss into a strategic success through the deliberate execution of a
psychological warfare.  Additionally, he shows how the Israelis, once adept at influence
operations against the British, later fall short of understanding its impact and have paid the
price for their ignorance. 
Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflict is a valuable history lesson useful for both
strategic analyst and the battlefield planner alike.  It offers insight into the background of the
decades-long wars and sheds light on the nature of the continued geopolitical struggles of the
Middle East.  Above all, any military professional who takes up this book will understand what
PSYWAR is good for.
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